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Putting electoral competition where it belongs:
comparing vote-based measures of electoral
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Aiko Wagnera and Werner Krause b
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ABSTRACT
Electoral competition is a cornerstone of representative democracies. However,
measuring its extent and intensity constitutes a challenging task for the
discipline. Based on multilevel conceptualizations, we discuss three different
measures of political competition (electoral volatility, vote switching, and
voters’ availability) and their relation to each other. We argue that electoral
volatility and vote switching as indicators of electoral competitiveness tend
to misestimate the degree of competition in multiparty systems. As an
alternative, we propose focusing on the individual’s propensity to vote for
different parties, i.e. electoral availability. Using data provided by the
European Election Studies, we compare availability to electoral volatility and
vote switching in the framework of necessary and sufficient conditions. Our
regression results show that operationalizing electoral competitiveness based
on voter availability – which is increasingly retrievable from cross-national
voter surveys – helps to avoid type-II errors, i.e. identifying competitive
elections as less or non-competitive.
KEYWORDS Political competition; volatility; electoral behavior; party systems; availability; vote
switching
Introduction
Electoral competition is one of the central concepts to describe and analyze
the state of democratic (party) systems. Broadly speaking, most researchers
see the competitive struggle for votes as the crucial mechanism that
ensures the fulfillment of critical functions of representative democracies
(Barry 1970, 99; Bartolini 2002). This literature links political competition to
the concept of electoral vulnerability to explain political responsiveness: Elec-
torally vulnerable politicians and parties, the argument goes, will be worried
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about how citizens react to their actions. As a consequence, they will con-
stantly try to anticipate these reactions by acting responsively. In line with
this, the empirical literature regards “vulnerability […] as being basically
the same thing as competition” (Bartolini 2002, 102).
One core question of political research therefore relates to how we can
measure political competition. Previous research has operationalized political
competition by focusing on the dynamics of the election results of political
parties. Hence, electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979) has frequently been used
as part of the measure of the intensity of political competition within a
given party system (e.g. Immergut and Abou-Chadi 2014; Kayser and Lind-
städt 2015; Hübscher and Sattler 2017). Higher volatility levels – the argument
goes – increase political parties’ vulnerability, which in turn contributes to
higher levels of competitiveness (Przeworski and Sprague 1971). Following
this assessment, individual-level vote switching can be regarded as a more
detailed measure of electoral competitiveness. To give a simple example: If
100 voters of party A switch to party B and 100 voters of party B switch to
party A, the net volatility equals zero. The result of many switching voters
would be the same as if all voters stayed with their former party. Hence,
the volatility measure would imply no competition between the two
hypothetical parties, although voter transfers point to a competitive election.
Discussing the individual-level component of political competition, van
der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991, 56-57) go a step further and argue that the
“concept of electoral competition is, in its essence, dispositional in character.
Consequently, the phenomenon of competition cannot be directly observed.
Actual behaviour (i.e. party choice) cannot reveal its existence”. As a result,
vote switching as a measure of electoral competition tends to ignore a
crucial component of electoral competition: the voters’ possible inclination
to vote for multiple parties. Thus, the sheer number of vote switchers gives
us little information about how many voters considered switching from
one party to another. Following Bartolini (1999), we argue that electoral com-
petition is primarily defined by the openness of voters to cast their vote for
multiple political parties, i.e. their availability on the electoral market. “The
availability of voters to switch their party/candidate allegiance is crucial
because competition theory (…) assumes that a quota of voters, in large
masses or in critical minorities, determines through their ‘potential’ defection
the anticipated reactions of the elite and therefore their responsiveness to
public opinion orientation” (Bartolini 1999, 461). The level of competition is
thus contingent on potential vote switching, not on actual voting shifts.
In this research note, we propose to operationalize political competition
and competitiveness based on the availability of a person’s vote for
different political parties (Bartolini 1999). Put differently, if a person considers
only one party as eligible and does not view any other party as a potential
voting option, there is no competition for this person’s vote. However,
2 A. WAGNER AND W. KRAUSE
supposing a person views several parties as a possible voting option, her
ballot is highly contested independently of whether she ultimately decides
to switch her vote or not. In practical terms, the availability measure thus
helps researchers to avoid type-II errors, as electoral volatility and vote
switching tend to identify elections as less competitive than when the avail-
ability of voters is examined.
We focus on the relation of electoral volatility, vote switching, and voter
availability in the framework of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Figure 1 represents this relationship: Only some available voters change
their party choice and only a fraction of these vote switches translates into
net volatility. Therefore, volatility is a subset of switching, which in turn is a
subset of availability.
Our two guiding hypotheses for this research note are that vote switching
is a necessary but not sufficient condition of volatility (H1) and that avail-
ability is a necessary but not sufficient condition of vote switching (H2).1
Reformulated in empirically observable terms (see also Tsebelis 1999), our
first hypothesis implies that switching and volatility are positively correlated
and that the variance of volatility increases with higher levels of switching.
Whereas low levels of vote switchers always lead to low volatility levels,
high levels of vote switching can lead to high or low levels of volatility –
depending on the extent to which two-way flows cancel each other out.
The same applies to our second hypothesis concerning the relationship
Figure 1. Set-theoretic relationship between volatility, switching, and availability.
Source: Based on Bartolini (1999, 467).
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between vote switching and availability: If availability is necessary but not
sufficient for vote switching, both variables correlate positively. Moreover,
the variance of switching increases with higher values of availability: high
levels of availability can lead to high or low levels of vote switching.
In the next section, we use a cumulated dataset of the six European Elec-
tion Studies (EES) and compare a measure of electoral availability to vote
switching and volatility. Our analysis supports our guiding hypotheses.
Based on these results, we propose focusing on the diversity of individual
party preferences – the electoral availability of a citizen’s vote – to measure
political competition. This approach directly captures the reasoning of
those scholars attempting to assess the competitiveness of elections:
Voters’ willingness to switch their vote choices is what makes a political situ-
ation competitive.
Data and operationalization
To measure individual-level availability, we rely on the operationalization
proposed by Wagner (2017). He suggests that a valid measure of an individ-
ual’s availability on the electoral market must meet the following criteria.
First, if multiple parties feature similar utilities for an individual – i.e. if a
voter has similar propensities to vote (PTVs) for various parties – her avail-
ability is relatively high.2 This person is undecided about who to vote for
and is therefore approachable for different parties. This undecidedness or
indifference occurs “if voters perceive little difference between alternatives”
(Aarts and Wessels 2005, 78) because those alternatives yield similar utilities
in the voters’ eyes. The opposite may result from high affective polarization,
i.e. a situation in which “a citizen likes one party and dislikes all others”
(Wagner 2020, 3). A PTV for one party of, say, 1 and a PTV for another
party of 0.9 means higher availability than PTV scores of PTV1 = 1 and
PTV2 = 0.7. Second, as a voter has (in most cases) only one vote, the
measure should consider the differences of the PTVs of all parties to the
most preferred party. Third, higher levels of individual PTVs imply a more
intense competition for this individual’s vote. Ceteris paribus, the higher
the respective PTVs, the higher the individual’s availability (if PTV1 = 1
and PTV2 = 0.9 the availability score should be higher than if PTV1 = 0.5
and PTV2 = 0.4).








where j denotes voters, PTVi stands for the propensity to vote for party i and
PTVmax refers to the party the person has the highest inclination to vote for.
3 N
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denotes the number of parties between a voter chooses to cast her vote. The
resulting measure ranges from 0 (available to only one party) to N− 1
(equally available to all parties in the party system). We take the average avail-
ability of all individuals within an election to estimate election level avail-
ability scores.4
Availability captures several dimensions that affect citizens’ party pre-
ferences. For instance, voters’ availability should be affected by the spatial
proximity to political parties. Also, individuals’ propensities to vote for
particular political parties makes it possible to consider voters’ utilities
as the result of a multitude of further factors (e.g. issue salience, partisan-
ship, leader evaluations, etc.). In contrast to vote switching, this measure
does not only focus on voters’ availability to another party than the one
they vote for. Instead, it is sensitive to the overall number of parties a
citizen considers voting for. Consequently, votes in multiparty systems
are, on average, more available than in two-party systems (cf. Wagner
2017, 516).
The second variable of interest is vote switching. Here, all voters
whose retrospective and prospective vote choices differ at the time of
the survey are considered vote switchers.5 In general, choosing ques-
tions of retrospective and future vote choices as a unit of analysis
comes with survey-related and methodological problems (Dassonneville
and Hooghe 2017). However, these issues are of less concern regarding
our study as we do not aim to identify actual voting behavior.
Instead, our argument refers to the conditional relationship between
individual-level availability, vote-switching, and volatility. We measure
the aggregate score as the share of vote switchers of the entire
voting population.
Electoral volatility constitutes our third variable of interest. Here, we use




| pi,t − pi,t−1|, (2)
where i stands for parties, p denotes a party’s vote share, and t indicates elec-
tions. Parties’ vote shares have been calculated based on respondents’ retro-
spective and prospective vote choices. The resulting data can be found in the
Appendix (Table A.4).
We use a cumulated dataset of the European Election Study (EES), which
covers 12 member countries6 of the European Union from 1989 until 2014.
Importantly, the data contains information on citizens’ retrospective/prospec-
tive vote choices and their propensity to vote scores. The EES is the only data
set providing PTVs for multiple countries and multiple points in time, enhan-
cing the generalizability of our analysis.7
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Empirical analysis
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we test whether the aggregate level
of vote switching determines the level of electoral volatility, and second,
whether vote switching is a function of individual-level availability. To do
so, we regress electoral volatility on vote switching (Hypothesis 1) and vote
switching on availability (Hypothesis 2). To control for country-specific
factors, we employ a country fixed-effects regression approach. In a second
step, we test whether the identified determinants are indeed necessary but
not sufficient conditions of the dependent variables by analyzing the
residuals of these regressions (Tsebelis 1999). However, it is worth mention-
ing that we do not aim to explain the variance in volatility per se. Instead, we
follow an x-centered approach and are thus interested in the effect of one
particular independent variable (Gerring 2001). Consequently, we do not
include every covariate potentially relevant for explaining varying levels of
volatility or vote switching. Before discussing our results, Figure 2 and
Figure 3 show the bivariate relations of interest.
The correlation between vote switching and volatility is about .77. The
visual inspection of the scatter plot seems to support the first hypothesis.
First, (nearly) all cases are below the 45 degrees line, which is a first indication
that vote switching is a necessary condition of electoral volatility. Second,
higher shares of vote switchers are associated with both higher and lower
levels of volatility. At the same time, lower percentages of vote switchers
Figure 2. Scatter plot of volatility and vote switching, 1989-2014.
Note: Dotted line shows 45 degrees line. Dashed line shows bivariate regression line incl. 95% confidence
interval.
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always lead to lower levels of volatility. For example, the Netherlands in 2009
and Portugal in 2014 featured similar levels of vote switching (close to 40
percent). However, only in the latter case did this translate into the highest
ever-observed volatility in this country (above .4). In contrast, most switching
canceled out in the Netherlands, resulting in a volatility score below .2. In a
similar vein, volatility reveals little information about the number of voters
that switched their vote from one party to another. Belgium featured
similar volatility levels in 1999 and 2009 (between .08 and .1). However, in
1999 the share of vote switchers was 10%, while 10 years later, it was 25%.
These discrepancies between volatility and vote switching lead to the tri-
angular shape typical for necessary but not sufficient conditions, where
empirical observations are closer to the regression line on the left-hand
side than on the right-hand side, i.e. the residuals increase from low to
high levels of vote switching. Table 1 provides more systematic empirical evi-
dence in favor of our first hypothesis.
In model 1, we regressed electoral volatility on vote switching.8 Not sur-
prisingly, there is a significant positive effect of aggregate switching on net
volatility. The second model displays the results of a linear regression of
the squared residuals (from the first model) on the vote switching variable
(see Tsebelis 1999). According to our first hypothesis, the residuals should
increase with higher shares of vote switchers. This argument is supported
since the beta-coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1%-
level. The residuals of model 1 indeed increase with higher levels of aggre-
gate vote switching.
Figure 3. Scatter plot of vote switching and availability, 1989–2014.
Note: Dashed line shows bivariate regression line incl. 95% confidence interval.
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Model 1a excludes Portugal and Spain 2014, Greece 2009, and Germany
2004, as these cases are outliers according to Cook’s distance criterion. The
results are only slightly weaker than in the original model. The Breusch–
Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity supports our hypothesis:
the null hypothesis of constant error variance is rejected (p-value < 0.001).
Consequently, we estimated the regression model with robust standard
errors to correct for missing homoscedasticity (model 1b). Although the stan-
dard errors slightly increase in this model, the results remain substantively the
same. Thus, the presented regression results support our first hypothesis on
vote switching as a necessary but not sufficient condition of electoral
volatility.
Next, we turn to the relationship between vote switching and availability. As
Figure 3 shows, the more available the electorate is, the higher is the share of
vote switchers. The bivariate correlation is about .50. Again, we find a triangular
shape in the distribution of empirical observations, with observations closer to
the regression line on the figure’s left-hand side. Lower levels of availability are
associated with lower levels of vote switching, but higher availability levels
might lead to either higher or lower levels of vote switchers. Comparing
France in 1999 and the Netherlands in 2014, we see that both cases show
nearly identical aggregated availability scores of about 3.5, while at the same
time, the number of switchers differs considerably. Whereas in the Netherlands,
40% of the voters intended to change their party vote from the last to the next
election, only about 15% in France had this intention. Conversely, the elections
in Greece in 2009 and 2014 show the same amount of vote switchers (34%). But
whereas the availability of the Greek electorate in 2014 was relatively high (3.1),
it was comparatively low in 2009 (2.0). Vote switching thus overestimates
voters’ loyalty in Greece in 2014, therefore underestimating the vulnerability
of political parties.
Mirroring Table 1, Table 2 displays the results of the OLS regressions of
vote switchers on availability. Once again there is a positive and significant
Table 1. Testing hypothesis 1 – Vote switching as a necessary but not sufficient
condition of electoral volatility
Main Models Robustness
(1) (2) (1a) (1b)
Volatility Residuals w/o outliers Robust s.e.
Switching 0.605*** 0.012*** 0.511*** 0.605***
(0.060) (0.004) (0.048) (0.080)
Constant −0.017 −0.000 −0.002 −0.017
(0.025) (0.001) (0.018) (0.021)
Observations 71 71 67 71
Adjusted R-squared 0.600 0.103 0.665 0.600
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. First-step models (models 1, 1a, and
1b) include country dummies.
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impact of aggregate availability on the level of vote switching (also after
excluding four outliers: Italy 1999 and 2004, Ireland 2009, and France 2014
– model 1a). Again, the positive test for heteroscedasticity, together with
the results of model 2, confirms our expectation that the residuals increase
with higher levels of availability. Thus, the results support our second hypoth-
esis: Higher levels of mean availability in an election are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for higher levels of vote switching.9
In Appendix B, we provide results on the relationship between vote
switching and availability based on like-dislike scales provided in the Com-
parative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). These models confirm our main
finding. The availability measure proposed in this article is thus applicable
to widely available post-election studies.
Conclusion
Measuring the intensity of political competition constitutes a central task of
political science to answer pressing questions concerning the current
working of democracy. Volatility and vote switching are often a part of indi-
cators of electoral competitiveness, and often these measures are precisely
the appropriate measure, depending on the research question and design
in place. For instance, if one’s research question focuses on the actual
number of voters a party has won from other parties, vote switching rep-
resents the appropriate approach. However, we have shown that vote switch-
ing and electoral volatility might produce type-II errors if used as a measure of
electoral competitiveness: While the votes of some citizens are available to
multiple parties, only some of these voters actually switch their party
choice, and only a subset of this switching translates into volatility. As a
result, one might classify an election as non-competitive based on the inspec-
tion of net volatility, although the electorate was, in fact, highly available. In
Table 2. Testing hypothesis 2 – Availability as a necessary but not sufficient condition of
vote switching
Main Models Robustness
(1) (2) (1a) (1b)
Switching Residuals w/o outliers Robust s.e.
Availability 0.113*** 0.004*** 0.119*** 0.113***
(0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.020)
Constant −0.111 −0.002 −0.127** −0.111**
(0.067) (0.003) (0.063) (0.052)
Observations 70 70 66 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.262 0.130 0.302 0.262
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. First-step models (models 1, 1a, and 1b)
include country dummies.
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this research note, we argued that taking electoral competition to the individ-
ual level by focusing on the multiplicity of individual party preferences is
helpful for a better understanding of political competition. More concretely,
voter availability allows us, if the data is available, to identify varying levels of
competition even if no differences in aggregate vote switching or volatility
are observable.
Using availability as a measure of political competition comes with various
additional advantages related to data collection issues. In contrast to vote
switching, availability does not suffer potential problems of biased responses
derived from recall questions (van Elsas, Miltenburg, and van der Meer 2016;
Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017).10 Moreover, vote switching tends to disre-
gard the growing number of non-voters due to biases introduced by social
desirability and sampling procedures (Blais and Rubenson 2013). We
believe that using the proposed availability measure helps us to overcome
this unfavorable feature. Next, using the index of availability enables us not
only to measure competitiveness in a given election (as the volatility and
vote switching measures do) but also during the whole electoral cycle.
Although individual-level data on voters’ party utilities have been scarce in
the past, national and cross-national election studies increasingly include
questions on individuals’ propensities to vote. Based on this trend, we are
optimistic that scholars can use individual-level data in the future if their
research interest refers to electoral competition and, therefore, to voters’
availability. Thus, this paper presents a first step towards a better understand-
ing of electoral competition and its valid measurement.
Future research should further focus on the implications of voter avail-
ability, as it is easily applicable to more fine-grained constellations of party
competition. For instance, availability allows focusing on how many voters
of one particular party are open to vote for other political parties. In the
past, much research has focused on vote margins and citizens’ vote inten-
tions to operationalize politicians’ vulnerability, and thus the competitiveness
of elections (see, e.g. Kuklinski 1977; Griffin 2006; Hobolt and Klemmensen
2008). The concept of voter availability allows for a more detailed under-
standing of at which point parties need to fear for their survival in office.
Next, future work will further deal with the role of voters’ availability as a pre-
condition of voters’ decision to switch their votes. Employing patterns of
voter availability in pre-election studies and linking them to vote switching
will open a more detailed and comprehensive understanding of political
competition.
One additional feature of the availability measure is that – in contrast to
vote switching and volatility – it does not automatically increase with the
emergence of new parties. It only reflects the rise of new parties if voters con-
sider voting for them and do not abandon their vote propensity for already
existing parties. Due to this, the availability measure is easily applicable in
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the context of less stable, mostly young democracies. We therefore believe
that voter availability constitutes a fruitful pathway for the literature
dealing with the evolution of party systems (see, e.g. Sikk 2005; Tavits 2008).
Notes
1. It is worth mentioning, however, that we do not apply a strict understanding of
necessary and sufficient conditions. A narrower definition of necessary/
sufficient would imply that there are no deviant cases, i.e. no cases with low
availability and moderate or high levels of vote switching. Against the back-
ground of possible measurement error in the data, we will outline our (more
stochastic-oriented) usage of the terms below.
2. The corresponding survey question reads as follows: “How probable is it that
you will ever vote for the following parties?” Answers range from 0 (not at all
probable) to 10 (very probable). For our purposes, we recoded all PTVs to
range from zero to one. Note that in earlier election studies, the numbers
ranged from 1 to 10. The rescaling to 0–1 still allows for comparison.
3. Naturally, the party the person has the highest propensity to vote for is not
included in the n parties mentioned in the equation.
4. We also calculated the median to take care of potentially influential outliers (cf.
Table A.5). We thank the anonymous reviewer for raising this point. Addition-
ally, we estimated the models restricting the individual-level sample to voters
only (cf. Table A.6). Neither specification changed the results significantly.
5. We therefore do not consider non-voters in the following analyses. Note that in
elections with highly fluctuating voter turnout, volatility can increase despite
moderate levels of vote switching. The depth of documentation of non-
voters in the surveys used, however, does not allow for further investigation
of this possibility. We thank one anonymous reviewer for making us aware of
this point.
6. The dataset contains information on Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom.
7. PTVs do relate to actual voting decisions (cf. van der Eijk et al. 2006). In 2014, 76
percent of the voters reported vote choice for the party with the highest PTV in
the last national election and 88 percent planned to do so in the next national
election. Using European Election data implies considering the second-order
nature of these elections (e.g., Giebler and Wagner 2015). However, potential
distortions due to the second-order nature should equally apply to all three
measures. As we are interested first and foremost in the relationship between
volatility, vote switching, and availability, the second-order nature of the elec-
tions does not affect the substance of our results.
8. Although including survey year dummies to the regression model risks overfi-
tting the model, we did so in a robustness test. Additionally, we added variables
controlling for the timing of the European Election Study within the national
election cycles However, controlling for these time variables does not change
the substantial interpretation of our empirical results (see table A.1 in the
Appendix).
9. We also analyzed the relationship between volatility and availability. As
expected, availability constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition of
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volatility. See Tables A.2 and A.3 as well as Figure A.1 in the Appendix. As an
additional robustness test, we estimated the relationship without online
panel election studies (Italy, Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands in 2004).
Here, response patterns (e.g., straight lining) might bias the measurement of
citizens’ availability. However, the results (not presented here) remain the
same once we drop these cases.
10. Note that, at the same time, the collection of citizens’ PTV scores is less costly
than collecting panel data which would give us a less biased picture of
voters’ switching behavior.
11. The following countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Taiwan, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Montenegro, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay.
12. As in the main text, outliers were excluded following Cook’s Distance criterion.
We also exclude elections with unreasonably high switching scores (above 60%)
as we expect errors in the party coding provided by CSES. This includes Bulgaria
(2001), Israel (2006 and 2013), Latvia (2010), Poland (2001 and 2005), Romania
(2004), and Serbia (2012).
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Appendices
Replication material is available in Harvard Dataverse at https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/1LYGLD.
Appendix A: Robustness tests and data
Table A.1. Results for Tables 1 and 2 with country and time dummies including time to
control for second-order effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Time since last nat. election −0.002 0.048*
(0.020) (0.025)
Time since last nat. election2 0.000 −0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
Constant −0.035 0.000 −0.077 −0.001
(0.032) (0.001) (0.047) (0.002)
Observations 71 71 70 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.676 0.066 0.727 0.034
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models 1 and 3 include country and
survey year dummies.
Figure A.1. Scatter plot of volatility and availability, 1989-2014
Note: Dashed line shows bivariate regression line incl. 95% confidence interval.
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Table A.2. Testing the implication from hypotheses 1 and 2 – Availability as a necessary
but not sufficient condition of volatility
(1) (2) (1a) (1b)
Volatility Residuals w/o outliers Robust s.e.
Availability 0.077*** 0.003** 0.059*** 0.077***
(0.017) (0.001) (0.014) (0.022)
Constant −0.106* −0.001 −0.063 −0.106*
(0.053) (0.001) (0.041) (0.058)
Observations 70 70 65 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.192 0.050 0.217 0.192
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. First-step models (models 1, 1a, and
1b) include country dummies.
Table A.3. Results for Table A2 including time to control for second-order effects
(1) (2) (1a) (1b)
Volatility Residuals w/o outliers Robust s.e.
Availability 0.071*** 0.003** 0.062*** 0.071***
(0.018) (0.001) (0.014) (0.023)
Time since last nat. election 0.033 0.023 0.033
(0.032) (0.023) (0.022)
Time since last nat. election2 −0.004 −0.002 −0.004
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant −0.144** −0.002 −0.115** −0.144***
(0.057) (0.003) (0.045) (0.064)
Observations 70 70 66 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.054 0.311 0.204
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. First-step models (models 1, 1a, and
1b) include country dummies.
Table A.4. Data
Country Election Year Availability Vote Switching Volatility
Belgium 1989 2.19 0.10 0.05
Belgium 1994 2.18 0.16 0.11
Belgium 1999 2.03 0.10 0.08
Belgium 2009 3.35 0.26 0.10
Belgium 2014 2.63 0.22 0.08
Denmark 1989 2.08 0.14 0.05
Denmark 1994 2.57 0.17 0.08
Denmark 1999 3.31 0.17 0.12
Denmark 2004 2.02 0.17 0.12
Denmark 2009 2.24 0.28 0.10
Denmark 2014 2.60 0.31 0.10
France 1989 3.79 0.15 0.11
France 1994 3.19 0.17 0.08
France 1999 3.63 0.16 0.11
France 2004 2.45 0.14 0.06
France 2009 2.83 0.33 0.18
France 2014 2.80 0.37 0.25
Germany 1989 1.64 0.13 0.07
(Continued )
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Table A.4. Continued.
Country Election Year Availability Vote Switching Volatility
Germany 1994 1.77 0.16 0.11
Germany 1999 1.43 0.19 0.14
Germany 2004 1.88 0.20 0.22
Germany 2009 2.01 0.35 0.13
Germany 2014 2.10 0.23 0.05
Greece 1989 0.74 0.10 0.09
Greece 1994 1.46 0.05 0.06
Greece 1999 1.88 0.14 0.13
Greece 2004 1.05 0.08 0.04
Greece 2009 2.01 0.34 0.14
Greece 2014 3.05 0.34 0.26
Ireland 1989 2.30 0.12 0.06
Ireland 1994 2.60 0.12 0.07
Ireland 1999 3.02 0.17 0.05
Ireland 2004 2.66 0.27 0.15
Ireland 2009 3.11 0.46 0.26
Ireland 2014 2.43 0.38 0.24
Italy 1989 2.32 0.13 0.05
Italy 1994 2.53 0.18 0.11
Italy 1999 3.40 0.46 0.31
Italy 2004 4.30 0.24 0.10
Italy 2009 2.77 0.24 0.12
Italy 2014 3.17 0.26 0.23
Luxembourg 1989 2.25 0.08 0.06
Luxembourg 1994 2.02 0.08 0.06
Luxembourg 1999 2.33 0.08 0.07
Luxembourg 2004 . 0.26 0.13
Luxembourg 2009 2.30 0.30 0.07
Luxembourg 2014 2.39 0.25 0.06
Portugal 1989 1.55 0.06 0.03
Portugal 1994 1.69 0.07 0.06
Portugal 1999 1.18 0.07 0.04
Portugal 2004 1.69 0.18 0.19
Portugal 2009 1.87 0.29 0.15
Portugal 2014 2.70 0.38 0.42
Spain 1989 1.34 0.22 0.08
Spain 1994 1.18 0.11 0.11
Spain 1999 0.92 0.11 0.05
Spain 2004 0.94 0.05 0.03
Spain 2009 1.72 0.24 0.10
Spain 2014 2.31 0.40 0.40
The Netherlands 1989 1.77 0.14 0.04
The Netherlands 1994 2.13 0.18 0.08
The Netherlands 1999 2.66 0.20 0.07
The Netherlands 2004 2.63 0.20 0.09
The Netherlands 2009 4.53 0.38 0.17
The Netherlands 2014 3.52 0.40 0.22
United Kingdom 1989 1.80 0.14 0.06
United Kingdom 1994 1.55 0.16 0.12
United Kingdom 1999 1.57 0.17 0.06
United Kingdom 2004 1.93 0.18 0.12
United Kingdom 2009 2.20 0.39 0.21
United Kingdom 2014 1.77 0.35 0.16
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Table A.5. Testing hypothesis 2 – Availability as a necessary but not sufficient condition
of vote switching: median availability instead of mean availability
Main Models Robustness
(1) (2) (1a) (1b)
Switching Residuals w/o outliers Robust s.e.
Availability 0.108*** 0.004*** 0.117*** 0.108***
(0.021) (0.001) (0.018) (0.019)
Constant −0.083 −0.001 −0.103* −0.083***
(0.063) (0.003) (0.055) (0.046)
Observations 70 70 65 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.261 0.111 0.361 0.261
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. First-step models (models 1, 1a, and 1b)
include country dummies.
Table A.6. Testing hypothesis 2 – Availability as a necessary but not sufficient condition
of vote switching: availability calculated without nonvoters in the last national election
Main Models Robustness
(1) (2) (1a) (1b)
Switching Residuals w/o outliers Robust s.e.
Availability 0.093*** 0.003** 0.095*** 0.093***
(0.021) (0.002) (0.017) (0.026)
Constant 0.082 −0.001 0.077 0.082***
(0.066) (0.004) (0.049) (0.068)
Observations 70 70 60 70
Adjusted R-squared 0.259 0.044 0.466 0.259
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. First-step models (models 1, 1a, and 1b)
include country dummies.
Appendix B: Replication with CSES data
We replicated our results on the relationship between vote switching and avail-
ability based on like-dislike scales provided in most post-election surveys. We
use the CSES Integrated Module Dataset, which covers elections around the
world since the early 1990s. In contrast to the European Election Studies, CSES
provides like-dislike scores for the most relevant political parties in a particular
election. One advantage of the CSES data is that the country set goes beyond
highly established West European party systems. If we find similar effects as pro-
vided in the main model, while including elections from countries such as Brazil,
Israel, Uruguay, South Africa, or New Zealand, this should strengthen the external
validity of our findings.
The corresponding survey question reads as follows:
“I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name
of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly
dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party
you haven’t heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so.”
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Making use of CSES data might affect the internal validity of the measurement of
political competitiveness. First, voters’ judgment on the likeability of particular politi-
cal parties might differ from the propensity to vote for the same party. Consider the
following example: A voter positions herself to the left of center of a particular party
system and is closely aligned with a social democratic party. Consequently, she will
only vote for this party. However, she might like other leftist parties as she prefers a
leftist coalition government. At that point, not only the propensity to vote and like-
dislike scores for the other leftist parties will differ from each other. The corresponding
availability score will also be higher if we make use of like-dislike scales. At the same
time, availability scores might be biased in the other direction. Imagine that a voter is
critical of all political parties in a party system and indicates low likeability scores for all
parties. Nevertheless, the voter might indicate higher propensities to vote for particu-
lar parties as he considers voting a civic duty. In that case, estimates based on like-
dislike scores will underestimate the resulting availability.
Second, CSES provides a broad collection of post-election surveys. It is important to
note that voters’ evaluation of parties’ likeability might be affected by the election
results or following coalition talks themselves. Hence, post-election bias possibly
affects the measurement.
Third, CSES includes numerous elections that took place in non-democratic set-
tings. We exclude those elections that are classified as “partly free” or “not free”
according to the Freedom ranking provided by Freedom House (Albania, Hong
Kong, Thailand, the Philippines, and Turkey).11 Moreover, we also exclude elec-
tions in highly unstable party systems, i.e. elections in which at least three
out of the six most successful political parties did not contest the previous
election (Poland 2011 and Slovenia 2011). The emergence of new parties
(but also the formation of electoral alliances) increases aggregate vote
switching independent of voters’ actual availability. In these cases, vote
switching can no longer be regarded as a function of availability.
Table A.7 shows the results if vote switching is regressed on the availability scores
derived from CSES’s like-dislike scores.12 By and large, our main findings are con-
firmed. Availability has a positive and significant effect on vote switching.
Moreover, the effect of availability on the first regression’s residuals is also
positive and statistically significant.








Adjusted R-squared 0.740 0.055
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Model 1 includes country dummies.
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